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A STRUCTURAL ETIOLOGY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
 
Charles Lincoln† 
ABSTRACT 
This article offers an interpretation of the problems addressed by and the 
eventual purpose of the United States government.  Simultaneously, it seeks to 
analyze and explain the continued three-part structure of the United States federal 
government as outlined in the Constitution. Subsequently I define the three parts of 
the federal government—judiciary, executive, and legislative—as explained 
through the lens of the Platonic paradigm of (logos = word = law), (thymos = 
external driving spirit = executive), and (eros = general welfare = legislative) 
extrapolated from Plato’s dialogues. 
First, the article establishes Plato’s theory of the three-part Platonic soul as a 
major premise, as in a syllogism. Second, the article lays out the generally accepted 
division of the U.S. Constitution as creating three parts to the federal government as 
a minor premise. Third, the syllogism completes by weaving in the major premise 
of Plato’s soul into the three parts of the United States federal government. This 
third step of application suggests possible future evolution of the structure. 
This article fits into the wider issue of the functionally efficient and naturally 
adaptive structure of the U.S. federal government.  Providing a historical and 
philosophical context to this structural analysis will serve as a framework for future 
research on the operation of the federal government. When the branches of the 
federal government step out of their roles, the balance of the structure of the federal 
government becomes disrupted occurring in liminal periods of paradigmatic 
change. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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 This paper argues that the tripartite system of government in the United States 
can be viewed through the Platonic concept of the soul (ψυχή).1 The major premise 
is that the United States federal government has three major parts—the judiciary, 
the executive, and the legislative. The minor premise of this paper is that the 
Platonic soul is divided into three parts—the  logos (λογιστικόν),2 the thumos 
(θυμοειδές),3 and the eros (ἐπιθυμητικόν).4 The syllogism and argument of this 
paper is that the three federal parts of government represent the Platonic soul: the 
judiciary being the logos, the executive being the thumos, and the legislative being 
the eros. This paper will explore these concepts in greater depth. As a corollary, 
when the soul of the polity5 becomes unbalanced, then people become dissatisfied 
with the government because government does not fulfill its function 
administratively—as in acting in opposition to the laws—and in promoting justice. 
However, sometimes overstepping a role in the Platonic soul of the polity is 
necessary change.6 
I.  PREMISES AND STRUCTURES OF ANALYSIS 
Presumed throughout this paper is that the world has order based in reason 
that reflects nature.7 In Plato’s Timaeus, the interlocutor suggests that nature is 
organized and is thus intelligible.8 The alternative to this presumption is that there 
                                                          
1 This can perhaps be better understood for purposes of this essay as “aspects of existence.” Also, consider the 
similarity to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis. See Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 3, 25 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1961). 
The Liddell & Scott's A Greek-English Lexicon defines the word as, “ψυχήψύχω I. breath, Lat. anima, esp. as 
the sign of life, the life, spirit.” Ψυχή, Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English 
Lexicon, (Clarendon Press, 1889), available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3Dyuxh%2F. 
2
 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 435e–442a (Allan Bloom ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter PLATO, 
REPUBLIC]. 
3 Id. at 439a, 439e3–4. 
4 Id. at 439d5–436a1-3. 
5 "A particular form of government or political organization.” Polity Definition, SEADICT.COM (Oct. 13, 2016), 
http://www.seadict.com/en/en/polity. 
6 In the dialogue, Socrates suggested the three parts of the soul should not prevent the other parts from 
functioning appropriately. PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 433a. 
7
 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA 3.22.33 (Loeb Classical Library, 1928). 
8
 PLATO, TIMAEUS 30a–31b (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2008). The page numbers used 
throughout this paper to refer to Platonic texts are in accord with the Stephanus pagination. Substantively, are 
randomness or patterns provable or real? How do we even decide what is random if not through statistical or 
other mathematical analysis? Philosophically speaking there could be a discrepancy between a series 
following a mathematical rule or being truly random. Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations 
explained how randomness can really be explained in terms of increasing complexity of following a rule, but 
paradoxically if everything can be shown to be following a rule it can also at the same time be shown to not 
follow a rule. 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The 
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can 
also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor 
conflict here. 
 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in 
the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each 
one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another 
standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule 
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying 
the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. 
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is no order to the universe or world and humans try to impose order to it.9 
Lucretius, in his On the Nature of the Universe, introduced such a view.10 
 Consequently, nature can represent itself in the structure of law, specifically 
the law of the United States.11 
                                                          
 
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an 
interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the 
substitution of one expression of the rule for another. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G.E.M. Anscombe & R. Rhees eds., 
G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1972). 
 
This makes one question whether randomness really exists or does everything follow a set rule? See. e.g.,  
Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Breaking the Rules?: Wittgenstein and Legal Realism, 107 YALE L.J. 1853, 1869–71 
(1998); Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1851 (1994); Scott 
Hershovitz, Wittgenstein On Rules: The Phantom Menace, 22 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD.619, 639–40 
(2002). 
9 Such an example can be seen in literature: 
Borges's The Library of Babel implicitly undercuts all the written structures -
- religion, science, art -- through which human beings strive to impose order 
on an unruly world. It consists of a fantastic monologue in which a Librarian, 
who lives in a Library which is also the universe, tries unsuccessfully to 
describe the chaotic infinity (or near infinity) that surrounds him. According 
to the Librarian, the Library may or may not be endless; but it is certainly 
meaningless, being made up of numberless books in a Babel of tongues. 
Because it contains all the possible combinations of letters in all languages, 
many of the books contain only an intelligible word or two, or are only 
partially true copies of books contained in their proper form elsewhere in the 
Library. The Librarians spend their time, among other ways, searching for the 
true catalogue that would bring order and meaning to their incomprehensible 
collection. 
Susan Mann, The Universe and the Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as Writer and Reader., 41 STAN. 
L. REV. 959, 965 (1989). 
10
 LUCRETIUS, ON THE NATURE OF THINGS (H. A. J. Munro trans.), reprinted in 12 GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD 1, 12 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). Concurrently, directly contrasting the Platonic 
theory of order the universe, 
The contrary materialist view characterizes archetypes as speculative 
constructs. Aristotle and Plato had their ancient Greek materialist counterparts 
in Epicurus, Democritus, and Lucretius, who in his On the Nature of the 
Universe wrote that all things began from "the purposeless congregation and 
coalescence of atoms." There are uniform and entirely natural causes in a 
closed system not ordered or otherwise affected by the presence of a higher 
mind capable of recognizing and ordering information. Thus Epicurus could 
hold that morality was merely a sensual matter of seeking pleasure and 
avoiding pain, not a sensitivity issue to any particular purpose or design. 
Aristotle's teleological universe was rejected for an atomistic universe without 
purpose or form in which biological forms and the ordered universe in which 
they exist were not the fixed product of information, intelligence, or design 
but of random accretion. Nobel Prize winning biologist George Wald, 
physicist Freeman [26] Dyson, and astronomer George Greenstein explain the 
improbability of the universe's remarkable order by suggesting either that the 
universe did not exist until humans observed it and (in Wald's words) that 
"[t]he universe wants to be known." 
Marion Hilligan, Nelson P. Miller, Don Petersen & Chris Hastings, Superhuman — Biotechnology’s 
Emerging Impact On The Law, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2007). 
11 Such as the interlocutor suggests nature represented itself in Athens. See PLATO, TIMAEUS, supra note 8, at 
90b–c. Recent work suggesting there is an order to the world’s structure: 
About fifty years ago a physicist called Paul Dirac asked himself why the 
number ten to the fortieth power keeps occurring. The square of this number, 
ten to the eightieth power, is the mass of the visible universe, measured in 
terms of the mass of the proton. The number itself, ten to the fortieth, is the 
present age of the universe, expressed in units of time it takes light to travel 
across a proton. And, get this, the constant that measures the strength of 
  125 
 
 
A. Why a Structured Approach at All? An Anthropological-Philosophical 
Explanation 
To understand why it is appropriate to analyze and compare the U.S. 
government with the Platonic concept of the soul, it is helpful to have some 
understanding of the context of philosophical-anthropological thought related to it. 
The following paragraph is a brief overview of relevant historical analysis to 
provide context related to structural and “trifunctionalist” analysis. Indeed, many 
anthropological-philosophical theories exist for understanding the basic structures 
of societies and governments, from Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism theories,12 
to Michel Foucault on the impetus behind government function,13 to Marvin Harris 
on gift giving incentives in a society’s structure.14 Concurrently, the idea of a 
“tripartite” structure of society being inherent to human cultures is not new, but it 
has been written about extensively by George S. Dumezil15 and has been addressed 
                                                          
gravity in terms of the electrical force between two protons is ten to the fortieth 
times weaker! Also, ten to the fortieth to the one-fourth, or ten to the tenth, 
just about equals the number of stars in a galaxy, the number of galaxies in the 
universe, and the inverse of the weakfine structure constant!  JOHN UPDIKE, 
ROGER'S VERSION 23–24 (1986); GEORGE JOHNSON, A FIRE IN THE MIND: 
SCIENCE, FAITH, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 308–16 (1996). 
Robert Birmingham, Proving Miracles and the First Amendment, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, n.60 (1996). 
12 “To illustrate the nature of structuralist theory, this discussion will concentrate on the work of Claude Levi-
Strauss. Levi-Strauss has made the search for the fundamental properties of human thought the focus of his 
work. His basic objective is uncovering the universal, basic structure of human thought, which is deep below 
the surface but is manfested [sic] in myth, language, cooking, table manners, and the general structures of 
social life. This basic structure, which is termed ‘deep structure,’ will identify cross-cultural similarities.” 
Donald H. J. Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of 
Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 390–91. (1982). 
13 In an article, Jinks explains: 
Michel Foucault's compelling and poetic methodological manifesto describes the nature 
of ‘critique’ and, thereby, the proper role of the critic. For Foucault, ‘critique’ was more 
than a means to an end; criticism was itself an act of resistance and refusal. Toward this 
end, Foucault sought to decouple criticism from positive programs for social and 
political change. Criticism is, according to this view, a negative operation - ‘essays in 
refusal’ - resisting and rejecting ‘what is’ without regard for ‘what needs to be done.’ 
For this reason, Foucault's views have occasionally been labeled ‘rejectionist.’ Such 
‘rejectionist’ claims, in turn, exemplify the most feared aspects of a new challenge to 
traditional legal thought: postmodernism.” 
Derek P. Jinks, Essays in Refusal: Pre-Theoretical Commitments in Postmodern Anthropology and Critical 
Race Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 499, 499–500. (1997). See also Tom Frost, Agamben′s Sovereign Legalization of 
Foucault, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2010) for a discussion on Foucault's ideas on law and sovereignty. 
14
 MARVIN HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY (1968). See also Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, 
Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 94. (1994); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Rise and Fall 
of the Chacoan State, 64 UMKC L. REV. 485, 528 (“The reciprocity concept justifies the assumption that one 
who gives will receive in return, though there are no hard promises as to timing, quality, or quantity.”); 
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC 72–6 (Routledge 1961) (1922) (regarding 
gift giving cultures). 
15 According to Dumezil, the division of society—government—into three parts was inherent in all Indo 
European societies. The trifunctional pattern (and implicit political separation of powers) is manifest among 
the Hindus in the original Castes: Brahmana (teachers, priests, keepers of the law), Ksatriya (Warrior Kings), 
and Vaisya (Farmers, Producers, Merchants and Doctors) (“For classic development of this so-called 
‘tripartite hypothesis’ concerning the division of social roles in Proto-Indo-European societies, see generally 
GEORGES DUMEZIL, FLAMEN-BRAHMAN (1935); Georges DUMEZIL, MITRA-VARUNA: AN ESSAY ON TWO 
INDO-EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY (Derek Coltman trans., 2d ed. 1988).”) Robin Bradley 
Kar, Western Legal Prehistory: Reconstructing the Hidden Origins of Western Law and Civilization, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1499, 1525 n.71. (2012). See GEORGES DUMEZIL, ARCHAIC ROMAN RELIGION 585 (1966); see 
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by Sigmund Freud’s division of psychoanalysis.16 Indicative of the universal nature 
of the “trifunctionalist,” Dumezilian approach has even been applied to Pre-
Columbian Yucatán Mayan societies.17 Poetically, in the Homeric Greek account of 
the Judgment of Paris— prior to the beginning of the Trojan War in Homer’s 
Iliad—Paris of Troy is given a Dumezilian "choice"—a beauty contest among three 
goddesses: Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite.18 It seems fitting to apply the Ancient 
Greek concept of the Platonic Soul to governmental structure because the 
“trifunctionalist” approach has origins in Ancient Greece, but it can also be seen in 
non-western civilizations. 
A balanced view of government may exist in the separation of powers as 
Montesquieu laid out: "that of enacting laws, that of executing the public 
resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."19 Exploring this thought “[i]n 
The Federalist No. 47, Madison explained that while Montesquieu was correct in 
saying that the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers was 
essential to liberty, that conclusion did not purport to tell us how strict the resultant 
separation had to be.”20 Based on their education, the framers of the Constitution 
may have even had Plato’s Soul in mind when they framed the Constitution.21 Even 
if the framers did not have Plato on their mind, the idea of Plato’s Soul is arguably 
inherent in humans regardless of how it is defined.22 Moreover, a structured 
approach to the philosophical underpinnings to a government can be assumed to 
have been in the framer’s mind — whether consciously or subconsciously. 
                                                          
also WOUTER W. BELIER, DECAYED GODS: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GEORGES DUMEZIL'S "IDEOLOGIE 
TRIPARTIE" 17–20 (1991) (for critiques of the trifunctional hypothesis). 
16 David S. Caudill, Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal Psychoanalysis, 66 
IND. L.J. 651, 658–659 (1991). See FREUD, supra note 1, at 19. 
17 Charles E. Lincoln, Ethnicity and Social Organization at Chichen Itza, Yucatan, Mexico (May 16,1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University). See Charles E. Lincoln, The Chronology of Chichen 
Itza: A Review of the Literature, 141, 141–156 in LATE LOWLAND MAYA CIVILIZATION: CLASSIC TO 
POSTCLASSIC, (Jeremy A. Sabloff & E. Wyllys Andrews V eds., 1986). 
18
 In THE ILIAD OF HOMER 14:28–30 (Richmond Lattimore trans., 25th reprint ed. 1976) (1951), it states: 
[T]he well known Judgment of Paris, which Homer apparently knew. Although it is not 
directly recounted in the Iliad, there is a clear reference to it in Book 14, where Hera's 
displeasure with the other gods (i.e., gods who were urging Achilles to treat Hector's 
corpse with respect) was attributed to the Judgment of Paris: ‘because of the delusion of 
Paris / who insulted the goddesses when they came to him in his courtyard / and 
favoured her who supplied the lust that led to disaster.’ The myth of the Judgment of 
Paris began when Peleus and Thetis did not invite Eris, the goddess of discord, to their 
wedding. Eris, feeling snubbed, concocted one of literary history's most evil schemes. 
She procured a golden apple and inscribed it ‘For the fairest.’ She then crashed the 
wedding feast and tossed the apple onto the table. Three goddesses, Hera, Athena, and 
Aphrodite, each argued that it should be hers. They asked Zeus to decide. He refused 
because he feared his wife's anger in the event that he did not choose her. He passed the 
buck and suggested that the Trojan prince Paris, the son of Priam, act as arbiter.” 
Russ VerSteeg, A Contract Analysis of the Trojan War, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 192 (1998). 
19
 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Pub. 1949) 
(1748). 
20 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 2004 (2011). 
21
 JAMES J. WALSH, EDUCATION OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF THE REPUBLIC: SCHOLASTICISM IN THE 
COLONIAL COLLEGES 104–05 (1970). 
22
 JEAN-FRANCOIS PRADEAU, PLATO AND THE CITY 129 (2002). 
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B. Why Plato? Truth and Justice in Plato 
If one accepts the premise that structured and philosophical approaches are 
a reasonable mode of analysis, then why should one use Plato’s approach 
specifically? 
This idea of comparing the Platonic soul to the United States federal 
system of government has previously been written about by Akiba Covitz in The 
Soul of the Polity.23 Covitz argued the syllogism as judiciary is the thumos, the 
executive is the logos, and the legislative is the eros.  This paper greatly appreciates 
and gains much inspiration from Covitz’s theory, but switches correspondences 
from thumos to logos for judiciary, logos to thumos for executive, and maintains 
Covitz’s conception of legislative as eros. However, Covitz uses a different 
terminology of 1) artifice, 2) nature, and 3) history/divinity/myth in lieu of logos, 
eros, and thumos, respectively.24 Covitz argues that the constitution had a 
psychoanalytic dimension, and these Platonic elements, in large part, represented 
this psychoanalysis.25 
Professor Covitz sincerely wanted to explore what a constitution is. He 
asked “tiesti or ‘what is?’” translated from Greek.26 This is a classic question that 
drove the Greeks as a purely innocent love for searching for knowledge.  This 
article has a sourced inspiration from such an inquiry. Covitz asks, “[w]hy, then, 
have I chosen Plato’s Republic along with the Constitution of the United States as 
the two main texts that I will analyze?”27 He answers, “My broadest goal is to seek 
the beginnings of American constitutional thought, and my related, narrower goal is 
to provide a response to the question of why the American Constitution is seen to 
be such a success.” Indeed, this represents a variation of the two-pronged endeavor, 
which this paper searches to solve. First, what does it mean for the three parts of the 
government to interact with one another? Second is, why has the American 
Constitution lasted so longand with relatively few amendments? 
Covitz suggests an easy answer to these questions would be to “choose the 
Constitution of the United States and a more contemporary and more 
straightforward text (at least in terms of form) such as Locke’s Second Treatise on 
Government, or Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws.”28 But Professor Covitz sought 
“more than a deeper understanding of the American Constitution; [he sought] its 
beginnings.”29 
Professor Covitz quotes an introduction to an edition of Plato’s works by 
Erich Segal where Segal quotes “Spanish neo-Kantian social theorist, Jose Ortega Y 
Gassett,” that succinctly indicates Professor Covitz’s and this article’s interest in the 
Republic. Covitz writes, “Ortega Y Gassett describes Plato’s influence on Western 
thought in the following manner: ‘It is impossible to tell [to] what deep levels of the 
Western mind Platonic notions have penetrated. The simplest sort of person 
                                                          
23 As far as the author knows, Akiba Covitz is the only person to have written on this subject. 
24 Akiba J. Covitz, The Soul of the Polity: Beginnings of American Constitutional Thought xxii–xxv (1999) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author). 
25 Id. at xvii–xx. 
26 Id. at iv. 
27 This article will also focus on the Constitution and Plato’s Republic, as well as other works that have 
interpreted them. 
28 See generally Akiba J. Covitz, The Soul of the Polity: Beginnings of American Constitutional Thought 80–
82 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author). 
29 Id. 
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regularly employs expressions and portrays views which are derived from Plato 
(Plato 1986, vii).’”30 
Covitz lays out the great appeal to using Plato’s work: “Put more simply, 
Plato has provided for the West a fertile image, founded on a complex theory of 
psychology and politics, of how the soul is seen as working and how it is intimately 
connected with politics and constitutions.”31 However, Covitz admits there is a 
darker — more tyrannical and dictatorial — side to Plato’s works. Specifically, 
“according to [Karl] Popper, Plato’s Republic is the handbook of tyranny and the 
guide to constructing a society closed to all change and freedom. Plato’s use of lies, 
myths, and the powers of divinity as aspects of constitutional life, are indicative for 
Popper of Plato’s falsity and duplicity (see Popper 1945).”32 This is a relevant 
argument because despite the appeal of Plato’s work for positive ideas, there has 
also been a more evil side to the works supporting fascism and Nazism. 
However, if one is to understand the beginning of the US Constitution, one 
must be familiar with not only the circumstances that gave its birthbut also the great 
books that the authors of the Constitution read. Covitz supports this by writing “if 
one is to search out the theoretical beginnings of American constitutional thought, 
one must come to grips with the textual beginnings of the Western constitutional 
thought in which the American experience is itself framed.”33 This can be 
interpreted as the books and laws with which the framers were most familiar, 
“regardless of our views of Plato’s tyrannical or democratic qualities. Important, 
underlying aspects of this broader realm of Western constitutional thought began in 
the dialogic pages and the constitutional theory of Plato’s Republic.”34 
1. Truth and Plato’s Forms 
Indeed, it must be mentioned that Plato’s soul has a special connection to 
truth and Plato’s “Forms” in his philosophy, as explained by Kenji Yoshino.35 
Unlike “the poet [who] always misrepresents the truth,” Yoshino claims, “[i]n the 
Republic, Plato describes the existence of immutable, abstract, and invisible 
Forms.”36 Yoshino states that “[t]hese Forms are the ideals to which Plato seeks to 
anchor the state and the human soul, which is the microcosm of the state. The 
highest Platonic aspiration for human beings is to bring us closer to these Forms. 
The difficulty is that our ordinary modes of perception—such as our senses—
cannot seize these ideas.” However, Yoshino interestingly writes, “Only right 
reason, as exercised through dialectic, can do so in any systematic way.”37 
                                                          
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1842–43 (2005). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1843. Conversely, Plato’s idea of the soul is similar but different from Aristotle’s view, 
Aristotle's use of the vocabulary of dunamis is unusually complex and requires 
clarification. A typical example of the first meaning ("innate") is found at 
ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, supra note 13, at 1105b20–28, which 
contrasts dunamis with a developed capacity. But in other passages, dunamis 
is clearly used in the sense of a developed capacity. Id. at 1094b2, 1101b13, 
1143a28. Finally, the term is sometimes used when the capacity is already 
active, and thus the conditions for its activation must be present. See 
ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA 412a1–413a10 (W.D. Ross ed., 1956) (defining 
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Plato’s — and Professor Yoshino’s — intersection of truth, as represented 
by the forms and justice compels one to look further into why the two are related.  
Professor Yoshino’s formulation of “right reason,”38 sounds akin to the 
concept of natural law. Natural law exists in religion and higher ethics, which may 
or may not exhibit themselves in statutes and case law. Natural can be defined as 
that which is not positive law, but it can also be defined as follows: “Natural law 
refers to the ethic of justice, fairness, or right. Although denominated ‘law,’ it is not 
positive law at all, but rather is a sense derived from God-given or rational 
sources.”39 Such a definition emphasizes the importance of religion as a base for 
natural law. However, it can also be based in rational reason or right reason as 
Professor Yoshino or St. Thomas Aquinas would argue.40 This means natural law 
can come from secular sources, and an atheist could believe in natural law through 
right reason or rational sources. 
An all-encompassing definition of natural law would not only contrast 
itself with positive law but would rather show how it, “relates to positive law by 
serving as a standard against which positive law can be judged. Natural law is 
frequently cited as the ‘ought’ and positive law as the ‘is,’ meaning that natural law 
is what should be done and positive law is what exists as the rule established by the 
sovereign.”41 
Alternatively, positive law is commonly referred to as law passed by 
legislatures or case law. For a succinct definition, “[e]very positive law, or every 
law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body 
of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein 
that person or body is sovereign or supreme.”42 
                                                          
psuche as the active organization of a body that has life, potentially, or 
dunamei). Of course, as Aristotle immediately points out, one is alive only 
when the body is actually alive, thus meeting all the "external" conditions for 
the presence of psuche. See id.; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Commentary 
on ARISTOTLE, DE MOTU ANIMALIUM 271, 363–64 (Martha Craven 
Nussbaum trans., 1978) (discussing ARISTOTLE, DE MOTU ANIMALIUM 
702a30–31, 703b29–32). 
Martha Nussabaum, The Supreme Court: 2006 Term: Foreword: Constitutions And Capabilities: 
"Perception" Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34  n.87 (2007). 
38 Yoshino, supra note 37, at 1843. 
39 Bruce D. Fisher, The Ethical Consumer: A Rejecter of Positive Law Arbitrage, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 230, 
245 (1994). 
40 Natural law can find its roots as far as the Ancient Greeks and Aquinas. Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law 
as a "Work of Reason": Understanding the Metaphysics of Participated Theonomy, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 41, 47, 
50. See generally, Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions., 102 
YALE L.J. 907 (1993). 
41 Fisher, supra note 41, at 245–46. 
42 Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 460 n.170 (1994). 
The author goes on to explain how, 
[Positive law] … is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a 
state of subjection to its author. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence 132 (Noonday, 1954). See also Frederick 
Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 799 (1993) (Legal positivism 
takes the position that the law "is not derived necessarily from fundamental moral 
principles, but rather is simply posited' by human beings and human institutions."), and 
the bibliography of major theorists cited therein. 
Id. at 460 n. 170. 
 
However, Professor Nonet, discusses the essence of positive law in relation to Nietzsche’s philosophy:  
What is positive law? We may begin with the familiar account that the word "positive" 
suggests immediately: positive law (Nietzsche calls it Gesetz) is law that exists by virtue 
of being posited (gesetzt), laid down and set firmly, by a will empowered so to will. Such 
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2. Justice and Plato 
In regards to the Platonic Soul, a person acts justly if the soul acts in 
concordance with each constituent part without overstepping its reach. A person 
acts unjustly if the soul acts in an unbalanced manner.43 Likewise, an unbalanced 
soul may follow any means necessary in Machiavellian fashion to reach a desirable 
goal.44 Choosing between what is viewed as natural law and positive law can 
depend on the balance of the soul.45 Indeed, in Sophocles’ play Antigone, the 
eponymous character suffered such a choice between following positive law or 
natural law when deciding to follow the edicts of King Creon not to bury her 
brother or her religious beliefs to bury her brother.46 Perhaps this choice between 
natural law47 and positive law48— also phrased as choosing between what is “right” 
and following the law—is one of the fundamental cruxes of jurisprudence.49 An 
informed viewpoint on the Platonic conception of the soul can help analyze choices 
between positive and natural law, understand the structure of the Constitution, and 
explain why former choices had been made and why some decisions in the Supreme 
Court and Congress are made the way that they are. 
3. Truth, Justice, and Plato 
  Thus, Plato intimately intertwines truth and justice. The Platonic forms—
eternal ideals—represent truth.50 Concurrently, justice represents human activity 
carrying out and adhering to the truth of the forms. However, how can human 
                                                          
law "exists" in the sense that it has validity (Geltung). It has validity if the will (Wille) 
from which it issues has the power (Macht) to impose it, to demand and secure obedience 
to its command. 
Philippe Nonet, What Is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667, 667–68 (1990). 
43 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 608c–621d. 
44NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1985)(n.d). 
45Cf. Christopher Bobonich, Persuasion, Compulsion, and Freedom in Plato's Laws, 41 CLASSICAL Q.  365 
(1991). 
46 Albert Grande, Education as a Natural Right, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 53, 54 (2006). 
Antigone, with clear conscience, deliberately violates King Creon's law that 
denies her brother a decent burial. Her brother had been a rebel and was 
thereby denied the honor of a proper burial. Antigone appeals to the higher 
unwritten laws of God, the eternal natural laws. While it is unknown when 
those laws originated, Antigone's act of defiance violates written laws in favor 
of natural law, which respects a sister's right to bury her brother, despite the 
king's prohibition. 
 
 
49 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS, 1.18, at 316–17 (Clinton Walker Keyes, trans., 
Harv. Univ.Press 2014) (n.d) (ebook)(“Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what 
ought to be done and forbids the opposite.”). It is interesting to consider how positive law is rooted in nature. 
50 Veronica Gentilli, A Double Challenge for Critical Race Scholars: The Moral Context, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
2361, 2368 (1992).    
On the Platonic view, concepts are immutable and eternal; they exist 
independently of the world around us.  Plato calls these concepts of 
independent and necessary truths “Forms.” For Plato, the Forms, or 
concepts, are reality; things in the world have only diminished reality since 
they are imperfect replicas of the Forms. Thus, a chair in the world is but an 
imperfect reflection of the concept, the abstract idea, of “Chairhood.” The 
material world is true and real only to the degree that it accurately reflects 
the Forms. We call a particular object a chair because we recognize it as an 
instantiation of the Form of Chairhood. 
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activity carry truth to achieve justice? This requires the elements of the Platonic 
soul to exist in a balance. But what is the Platonic soul? What are its elements? 
How can they exist in harmony? 
II. THREE PARTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The Judiciary 
The role of judiciary in large extent is to follow syllogistic and logical 
application of the law as found in the idea of stare decisis et non quietamovere,51 to 
provide a system of legitimacy and predictability.52 As the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated, “[s]tare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent; the 
term is but an abbreviation of stare decisis et non quietamovere - ‘to stand by and 
adhere to decisions and not disturb what is settled.’”53 
However, pure syllogistic thinking manifested in stare decisis does not 
always occur. Although Justice Rehnquist—writing for the majority in Payne v. 
                                                          
51 See Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300, 314 (Mich. 2009). 
Stare decisis is short for stare decisis et non quietamovere, which means 
“stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm.” Stare decisis attempts 
to balance two competing considerations: the need of the community for 
stability in legal rules and decisions and the need of courts to correct past 
errors. This doctrine has been part of the American legal landscape since the 
country's formation. 
The Court further noted “[t]he doctrine can be traced back to medieval England.” Id. at 387 n. 38. 
 
See also Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 56–62 (2001) 
(hereinafter “Healy”). However, the article itself notes that very few cases were recorded during the Anglo 
Saxon period. However, there were many records of Anglo-Saxon and Norman history such as the ANGLO-
SAXON CHRONICLE D: COTTON TIBERIUS B IV (1067), ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 150 (David C. 
Douglass & George W. Greenaway eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed.1981). Indeed, there are even visual 
representations, such as the Bayeux Tapestry. See THE BAYEUX TAPESTRY, A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY (Sir 
Frank Stenton ed., Phaidon Press rev. ed. 1965). 
 
But earlier Roman law was itself a compilation of cases in digests, which Roman lawyers would reference. 
Shael Herman, Legacy and Legend: The Continuity of Roman and English Regulation of the Jews, 66 TUL. L. 
REV. 1781, 1797 (1992). Even as early as the 1st Century B.C. “Cicero praised his friend, the jurist Servius 
Sulpicius Rufus for using dialectic and treating law as [a science],” indicating that — much like the modern 
method of using case law—Romans treated like cases alike. James Gordley, The Method of the Roman Jurists, 
87 TUL. L. REV. 933, 947 n.73 (2013). See generally PETER STEIN, REGULAEIURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO 
LEGAL MAXIMS (1966). 
 
By 1256 Henry de Bracton wrote of the importance of using past precedent he experienced previously to 
decide current cases before him, as indicated by his saying, “’(i)f any new and unusual matters arise, which 
have not before been seen in the realm, if like matters arise let them be decided by like since the decision is a 
good one for proceeding a similibus ad similia.’” Healy, supra, at 56–57. 
52 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.723, 749–752 
(1988). 
53 United States IRS v. Osborne (In re Osborne), 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 
Moreover, that court unpacked the etymology of stare decisis writing, 
[c]onsider the word “decisis.” The word means, literally and legally, the 
decision. Nor is the doctrine stare dictis; it is not “to stand by or keep to what 
was said.” Nor is the doctrine stare rationibus decidendi–“to keep to the 
rationes decidendi of past cases.” Rather, under the doctrine of stare decisis a 
case is important only for what it decides-for the “what,” not for the “why,” 
and not for the “how.”  Insofar as precedent is concerned, stare decisis is 
important only for the decision, for the detailed legal consequence following 
a detailed set of facts. 
Id. at  309. 
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Tennessee—admits, “Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters 
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity 
of the judicial process.”54 Moreover, regarding policy, Rehnquist writes, 
“[a]dhering to precedent ‘is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is 
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.’”55 
However, he claims “when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly 
reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.””56  In other 
words, “Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it ‘is a principle of 
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’”57 Justice 
Rehnquist further indicates that the claim that stare decisis is a principle of policy is 
“particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible.’”58 
Rehnquist’s opinion on stare decisis has been affirmed and restated in 
several Supreme Court opinions, recently in Johnson v. United States, where Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion stated that “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis allows us to 
revisit an earlier decision where experience with its application reveals that it is 
unworkable,” showing how experience can inform application of stare decisis.59 
At first, this move away from purely logical toward using “experience” 
may seem like a contradiction of the purely logical aspect of the logos in the 
Platonic soul. Indeed, this is not akin to the elegantia juris using pure logic in law 
as envisioned by the Romans.60 Rather, it is more similar to Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s legal realism as expressed in his book The Common Law, “[t]he life of 
the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”61 Indeed, Holmes criticized the 
purely scientifically logical methods proposed by Professor Christopher Columbus 
Langdell62 that he “could be suspected of ever having troubled himself about Hegel, 
                                                          
54 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 737–738 (1991). 
55 Id. at 738 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
56 Id. at 827, (quoting  Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). 
57 Id. at 828 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). 
58 Id. at 831 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
59 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015). 
60 Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 861 (1989). 
61
 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1963) 
(1881). 
62 Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and the Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355 (1999). 
 
C.f. id. n.161 “The Civil Code of the State of New York (pt. 1), 2 ALB. L.J. 385, 385 (1870). This was the idea 
behind the case method introduced by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School in 1870, where 
Carter had trained. See Wiecek, supra note 10, at 92–93.” 
 
Indeed, many legal scholars, 
have long viewed Christopher Columbus Langdell, the Dean of Harvard Law 
School from 1870 to 1895, as the prototypical American jurist of the late 
nineteenth century. He portrayed the common law as a conceptually-ordered 
scientific system in which rigorous logical reasoning trumped concerns about 
the just resolution of particular cases. In Langdell's Orthodoxy, probably the 
most influential modern article on Langdell, Thomas Grey dubbed this 
system of legal thought “classical orthodoxy." Others have labeled it 
"mechanical jurisprudence," "classical legal thought," "liberal legal science," 
or "Langdellian formalism." Whatever term they have preferred, scholars 
have long agreed that Gilded Age legal thinkers viewed the common law as a 
rigidly logical, amoral system. 
Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical Jurisprudence of 
Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 150 (2007). 
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we might call him a Hegelian in disguise, so entirely is he interested in the formal 
connection of things, or logic, as distinguished from the feelings which make the 
content of logic, and which have actually shaped the substance of the law.”63 
Indeed this mode of realism could come into action in judicial decisions 
specifically with “sociological jurisprudence”—proposed by Roscoe Pound—
whereby courts could consider social factors in decision making.64 Furthermore, 
Holmes wrote that even decisions that appear to be based on firm logical deductions 
are actually decisions of policy, stating that “[p]erhaps one of the reasons why 
judges do not like to discuss questions of policy, or to put a decision in terms upon 
their views as law-makers, is that the moment you leave the path of merely logical 
deduction you lose the illusion of certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like 
mathematics.”65 He declared, however, that choosing the premises, being the choice 
of policy then using logical deductions from there, for “certainty is only an illusion, 
nevertheless.”66 
Executive 
A prime example of the outline of the definition of the Executive branch’s 
power is seen in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.67 The case rose as a 
result of the steel strikes during the Truman Administration during the Korean War 
when President Truman sought to take executive control over the steel producers 
under the inherent powers doctrine.68 
 Writing for the majority opinion, Justice Black stated the Presidential and 
Executive power “must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself.”69 
 The Court’s majority opinion stated that the Court could not “with faithfulness 
to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces 
has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to 
keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's 
lawmakers, not for its military authorities.”70  
 Furthermore, the Court declared that “[i]n the framework of our Constitution, 
the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea 
                                                          
63 Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS 
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS 
COVERED BY THE CASES (1880)). 
 
Holmes continued a sentence later, 
[t]he form of continuity has been kept up by reasonings [sic] purporting to reduce every 
thing to a logical sequence; but that form is nothing but the evening dress which the new-
comer puts on to make itself presentable according to conventional requirements. The 
important phenomenon is the man underneath it, not the coat; the justice and 
reasonableness of a decision, not its consistency with previously held views… As a 
branch of anthropology, law is an object of science; the theory of legislation is a scientific 
study; but the effort to reduce the concrete details of an existing system to the merely 
logical consequences of simple postulates is always in danger of becoming unscientific, 
and of leading to a misapprehension of the nature of the problem and the data. 
Id. 
64 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606 (1908). 
65 Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894). 
66 Id. 
67 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
68 Id. at 582–585. 
69 Id. at 585. 
70 Id. at 587. 
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that he is to be a lawmaker.”71 This means that the Constitution limits the 
Executive’s rulemaking force. Instead, the Court continues interpreting the 
Constitution so as to give power to the legislature to make rules: “‘All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .’ After 
granting many powers to the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress 
may ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.’”72  
Finally—perhaps in an originalist interpretation fashion—the Court 
declared that “[t]he Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the 
Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the 
historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their 
choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot 
stand.”73 As a result of the case, in the concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter wrote 
“[l]oose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all nonlegal and much legal 
discussion of presidential powers. “Inherent” powers, "implied" powers, 
"incidental" powers, "plenary" powers, "war" powers and "emergency" powers are 
used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable meanings.”74 
 Discussing the Separation of Powers in his concurring opinion, Justice 
Frankfurter, quoting Justice Brandeis, stated,  
[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention 
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the 
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers 
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.75 
 
 In relation to the thumos, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. represents how the 
Executive branch is limited in its functions of making laws but it carries out these 
laws. The Executive may resolve conflicts through agencies, specifically through 
the Chevron deference doctrine, whereby the Supreme Court decided that 
“considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction 
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to 
administrative interpretations.”76 
Justice Stevens wrote: “[i]n the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,77 
Congress enacted certain requirements applicable to States that had not achieved 
the national air quality standards established by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) pursuant to earlier legislation.”78 He continued stating that, “[t]he 
amended Clean Air Act required these ‘nonattainment’ States to establish a permit 
program regulating ‘new or modified major stationary sources’ of air pollution.”79 
                                                          
71 Id. at 587. 
72 Id. at 588 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I , § 1). 
73 Id. at 589. 
74 Id. at 646–47 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
75 Id. at 629 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 293 (1926)). 
76 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
77 Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685. 
78 Id. at 839–40. 
79 Id. at 840. 
  135 
 
Furthermore, the EPA required that plants comply with a certain level of 
conditions.80 The issue of the case was “whether EPA's decision to allow States to 
treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as 
though they were encased within a single “bubble” is based on a reasonable 
construction of the statutory term "stationary source.’”81 
The Court reasoned that when reviewing an agency’s construction of a 
statute, it must ask two questions.82 The first question is “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”83 The second question arises if 
“Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue…the question for 
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute,” meaning the court defers to an agency’s interpretation.84 Concurrently, 
if the agency does not have an interpretation, the court would interpret the statute.85 
The Court reasoned and “justified this new general rule of deference by 
positing that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretive authority to all agencies 
charged with enforcing federal law.”86 Indeed, the “the decision [made] 
administrative actors the primary interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts 
to the largely inert role of enforcing unambiguous statutory terms.”87 
The Legislative 
  Given the example of the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress passed a law 
representing a will of portions of the country to prohibit alcohol. But as the Twenty-
first Amendment shows, the Eighteenth Amendment did not accurately represent 
what people desired. In a sense, the Eighteenth Amendment represented the soul of 
the polity losing control. This was initially an unjust result, although deemed just at 
the time, and so Congress repealed it, deciding that the Twenty-first Amendment 
was just, and the Eighteenth, consequently, was deemed unjust. 
The need for rules of statutory interpretation indicates the necessity of 
interpreting complex laws.88 This could result from many factors, such a quick 
drafting or political maneuvering to gain votes.89 Professor Gluck has pointed out 
that much of the public outcry against the courts and the legislature exists because 
we do not have a clear idea of what they should be doing: 
These moves have been grounded in a spectacular lack of theory about the 
role that courts should play in the legislative process itself—which is, after 
all, the fundamental constitutional question of the Court-Congress 
relationship in statutory cases. Should courts try to understand how 
                                                          
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 843. 
83 Id. at 842–43. 
84 Id. at 843. 
85 Id. 
86 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 969 (1992). 
87 Id. at 969–70. 
88 Abbe R. Gluck, Comment, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era 
of Unorthodox Law Making, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63 (2015). 
89 Cristina Marcos & Sarah Ferris, House Votes to Repeal ObamaCare, THE HILL (Dec. 8, 2015), 
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/231638-house-votes-to-repeal-obamacare [http://perma.cc/C7FH-LV65]. 
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Congress works, or is Congress too complex to understand? Should courts 
be "tough" on Congress, perhaps to incentivize Congress to draft better the 
next time, or should courts cut Congress some slack, and even correct 
enacted imperfections? Perhaps courts are best conceived as guardians of 
the U.S. Code, obligated to shape increasingly imperfect statutes into a 
more coherent product for the public, no matter how disconnected that 
result may be from Congress's own intentions. The Court has long resisted 
definitively answering these basic questions, even as the most difficult 
statutory cases turn on them.90 
Indeed, the problem with the legislature or courts not conforming to its 
theoretical role within the three branches of government has occurred in other 
branches as well, including the judiciary with the Supreme Court. Even “[t]he 
Warren Court understood the problems and the promises of politics from its own 
experience. The Court numbered among its members former senators, 
representatives, and state legislators, a former governor and a former mayor, and 
former cabinet members.”91 
Moreover, there does not seem to be a uniform system of interpreting 
statutes, despite its importance in courts upholding the rules.92 Consequently, some 
argue for adopting a uniform system of statutory interpretation.93 Indeed, there 
could be problems with using different types of statutory analysis within courts 
because one method may work in one case but not another, yet the subsequent 
courts would be urged to use precedent from the former case.94 Alternatively, others 
argue against a uniform system of statutory interpretation because such a system 
could lead to a rigid system of stare decisis for interpreting statutes.95 However, 
despite several states having adopted “methodological” and “formalistic” stare 
decisis,96 it is unclear whether the method produces equitable results.97 
                                                          
90 Gluck, supra note 88, at 63. 
91 Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). 
92 Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C.L. REV. 585, 588 (1996). 
93 E.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus 
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010) (“Methodological stare decisis—the 
practice of giving precedential effect to judicial statements about methodology—is generally absent from the 
jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation, but appears to be a common feature of some 
states' statutory case law.”). 
94 Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 635, 637–38 
(2008) (illustrating some of the problems of using different types of statutory analysis with courts, because one 
method may work in one case, but not in another). 
95 Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U.L. REV. 209, 217–19 (2105) 
(arguing against a uniform system of statutory interpretation). 
96 Gluck, supra  note 91, at 1754 n.8 (expanding on the terms explaining that 
“[b]y ‘formalistic,’ I mean clearly defined, ex ante interpretive rules arranged to be applied in a 
consistent order. But the characteristics of the particular rules chosen (for instance, whether and 
when legislative history may be consulted) need not themselves be rigid. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636, 638 (1999) ("Formalist 
strategies…entail three commitments: to promoting compliance with all applicable legal 
formalities (whether or not they make sense in the individual case), to ensuring rule-bound law… 
and to constraining the discretion of judges… ").” 
97 Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1863 (2008). 
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Although the legislatures have utmost formality, such Robert’s Rules of 
Order98 or Thomas Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice,99 statutes that 
from Congress are often unclear. 
III. PLATO’S SOUL 
A. Welcome to Plato’s Soul 
Before an understanding of how the Platonic soul functions within the 
United States federal government, a brief outline of Plato’s conception of the soul is 
required. Plato wrote that the soul (ψυχή) consists of three parts: the λογιστικόν 
(logical), the θυμοειδές (thymotic/spirit), and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (appetitive/
erotic).100 Concurrently, a person has all three parts within herself or himself and 
acts justly if all the parts of the soul act as it is supposed to act.101 If each part of the 
soul and each part of the city conduct their activities according to their “nature” or 
part of the soul, then all three parts of both city and individual will produce 
justice.102 
B. Logos 
Logos (λογιστικόν)103 in the Platonic sense represents the part of the soul 
that loves knowledge and the search for knowledge.104 The word in itself has a 
unique concept behind it: “λογιστικόν is one of Plato's many synonyms for the 
intellectual principle. Cf. 441 C, 571 C, 587 D, 605 B. It emphasizes the moral 
calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion.”105 This idea can be 
compared to the section in the Phaedrus where “Socrates compares the soul to a 
charioteer who controls two horses—one white and docile and the other black and 
intemperate. These three figures echo the division of the soul into reason, emotion, 
and appetite in Book IV of the Republic.”106 The charioteer is logos keeping control 
of the two horses. 
                                                          
98
 HENRY ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED (Sarah Corbin Robert ed., 9th ed.1990). See 
also Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, And The Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 
971 (1989). 
99
 THOMAS JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE (1801), reprinted in Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987). 
100 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 443c–e. 
101 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 441d12–e2. 
102 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 433a (Socrates stated,“[a]nd what we did lay down, and often said, you 
recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature is best adapted.” 
Likewise, if this does not happen, then there would be injustice (ἀδικία).). 
103 Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, AN INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON, available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3Dlogistiko%2
Fs (Etymologically speaking, The Liddell & Scott's A Greek-English Lexicon defines the word as,” 
λογιστικός from λογιστής 1 I. skilled or practised in calculating, Xen., Plat.:— ἡ λογιστική (sc. τέχνη), 
arithmetic, Plat. II.endued with reason, rational, Arist.:— τὸ λ. the reasoning faculty, Plat. 2.using one's 
reason, reasonable, Xen.”). 
104
 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 435e. 
105 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 439d, n.8 (“Cf. Crito 46 B (one of the passages which the Christian 
apologists used to prove that Socrates knew the λόγος), Theaetetus 186 C ἀναλογίσματα πρόςτεοὐσίαν καὶ 
ὠφέλειαν, and Laws 644 D. Aristotle Eth. 1139 a 12 somewhat differently.”). 
106 See generally, Yoshino, supra note 37. 
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C. Eros 
Eros (ἐπιθυμητικός)107 in the Platonic sense represents what Socrates says is 
“that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation of other 
desires, the irrational and appetitive — companion of various repletions [sic] and 
pleasures.”108 
D. Thumos 
Thumos (θυμοειδές)109 in the Platonic sense represents the “spirit”110 of 
unifying with the logos but resisting the erotic part of the soul.111 James Adam 
wrote in regards to this part of the Platonic soul that 
[t]here is also a third element or part of soul, that which we call the element 
of Spirit. It is distinct from the Appetitive element, with which, indeed, it 
frequently contends. Its function is to support the Rational part of the soul. 
In a man of noble character the spirited element is quiescent or the reverse 
in accordance with the commands of Reason. It must not however be 
identified with Reason; for it is present in children and the lower animals, 
whereas Reason is not. Homer also recognises that the two elements are 
                                                          
107 Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, AN INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON, available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3De)piqumhtik
o%2Fs (Etymologically speaking, the Liddell & Scott’s A Greek-English Lexicon defines the word as, 
“ἐπιθυμητικός from ἐπιθυμέω [select] desiring, coveting, lusting after a thing, c. gen., Plat., etc.:—adv., 
ἐπιθυμητικῶςἔχειντινός ῀ ἐπιθυμεῖν.”).See alsoRandall Baldwin Clark, Platonic Love in a Colorado 
Courtroom: Martha Nussbaum, John Finnis, and Plato's Laws in Evans v. Romer, 12 YALE J. L. & 
HUMANITIES 1, 5–6 (2000). 
108 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 439d. 
109Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, AN INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON, available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3Dqumoeidh%
2Fs (defining the word as, “θυμοειδής 1 εἶδος 1. high-spirited, courageous, Lat. animosus, Plat., Xen. 2. hot-
tempered, restive, id=Xex”). 
110 This spirit has been described in a: 
distinctively Platonic sense of θυμόςas the power of noble wrath, which, 
unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though 
as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, 
and so, as Glaucon suggests, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in 
the mortal soul of the Timaeus 69 D. In Laws 731 B–C Plato tells us again that 
the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous 
indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference 
remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. 
Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, De ira, i. 9, and passim. 
Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, Lord Brougham: 
“Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger. The supine 
placidity of civilization is not favorable to animosity [Bacon's word for 
θυμός].” Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to 
contradict Plato: “The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I 
hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate 
from the emotions,” etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical 
ethical issue he is with Plato. 
PLATO, PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES, VOL. 5 & 6 439(E) N.1 (Paul Shorey trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1969). 
111
 JAMES ADAM, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 439(e)–441(c) (1902), available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0094%3Abook%3D4%3Asectio
n%3D439e. 
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distinct. 
The analogy between the righteous city and the righteous soul is continued 
throughout this section. It should be noted however that the parallel is no 
longer quite exact. The difference between θυμοειδές and λογιστικόν in 
the soul is greater than that between auxiliaries and rulers in the State: for 
the λογιστικόν is not a select part of the θυμοειδές—as the rulers are of the 
soldiers—but something generically distinct from it. Otherwise the 
analogy holds (with the reservations mentioned on 435 A).112 
 Further, this key concept of thumos/spirit (θυμός) can be described as the:  
distinctively Platonic sense of θυμός as the power of noble wrath, which, 
unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, 
though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part 
of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggets, be akin to appetite, with which it 
is associated in the mortal soul of the Timaeus 69 D. In Laws 731 B-C. 
Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the 
capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger 
always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them 
and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, 
De ira, i. 9, and passim. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. 
Bagehot, Lord Brougham: “Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty 
of easy anger. The supine placidity of civilization is not favorable to 
animosity [Bacon's word for θυμός].” Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, 
pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: “The supposed conflict 
between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply 
that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions,” etc. But this is 
only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato.113 
E. The Platonic Soul Overall 
 Essentially, the Platonic soul (ψυχή) consists of three parts: the λογιστικόν 
(logical), the θυμοειδές (thymotic/spirit), and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (appetitive/erotic). 
Each part represents an integral part of human functioning, but there must be a 
balance among the parts for justice to exist. 
IV.  COMPARING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE 
                                                          
112 Id. 
113
 PLATO, PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES, supra note 110, at 439(e) n.1. 
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PLATONIC SOUL 
A. Judiciary as Logos 
1. Explaining Why the Judiciary is Not Thumos 
The judiciary114 in this paper’s paradigm represents logos. Logos is part of 
the Platonic part of the soul that represents logic.115 This contrasts with Professor 
Covitz’s formulation of the judiciary representing the thumos. His argument is 
compelling; however, in the Republic, Socrates states that a person “watering and 
fostering the growth of the rational principle [logos] in his soul and the others the 
appetitive and the passionate [two representing eros],” and this specific person “is 
not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,” 
meaning this person has not become evil but is just in between the pull of logos and 
eros.116 Socrates says this tension will resolve in “a compromise and turns over the 
government in his soul to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and 
becomes a man haughty of soul and covetous of honor [meaning a turn to the 
thymotic part of the soul].”117 
This indicates that one will likely turn to politics while in the tension of 
logos and eros, and in other words has become thymotic. This is more akin to the 
President, a politician, who in all likelihood is in search of honor, much like other 
politicians. Because if the executive of the country did not seek honor or maintain 
some “haughtiness,” other politicians and world leaders would take advantage of 
us. She must be a decisive president, not merely logical. Yet, logic—as well as 
eros—may exist within her, but  as President she must have a prevailing thymotic 
element. 
This is in sharp contrast to the Article III judges, especially. These 
judges—as intended by the framers of the Constitution—were not and are not 
politicians seeking re-election.118 Rather, they are aloof from the political system 
seeking to interpret and apply the law.119 This logical analysis—which can be 
informed with the other elements of the soul—is the guiding principal of the 
judiciary. The judiciary represents logos. 
3. Cases and Examples Showing Why the Judiciary Represents Logos 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates designates the charioteer as logos keeping 
control of the eros and thumos. Likewise, Chief Justice Marshall said, “it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
                                                          
114 "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Further, Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison stated, “[t]he particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States 
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant 
to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.” 5 US 
137 (1 Cranch) at 180. 
115 W.K.C. GUTHRIE, A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 419–34 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1962). 
116
 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 550b. 
117 Id. 
118 Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove A Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 87–88 (2006) 
119 Id. at 136–37. 
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is.”120 The Supreme Court uses judicial review and interprets the Constitution and 
legislatively passed statutes to keep them in check much like the charioteer in 
Plato’s Phaedrus. 
When constituent parts of the soul become imbalanced, then unjust results 
arise, as in Plessy v. Ferguson.121 However, imbalance and stepping out of a role in 
the separate powers may lead to more just and fair results, as in Brown v. Board of 
Education.122 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court stepped out of its judicial 
authority and took on a legislative function, but with an unjust result. The Court 
statutorily declared that a “[s]tate, shall provide equal but separate 
accommodations” for members of different races.123 
 In Brown v. Board of Education,124 the Supreme Court stepped out of its 
judicial authority and took on a legislative function but with a just result. In Brown, 
the Court noted that “[t]he doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ did not make its 
appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson… involving 
not education but transportation,” showing that the Court in Plessy stepped out of 
its mode of stare decisis and made law based on no previous law.125 
 Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges,126 the public was split, with many in 
the United States appreciating the decision, and others seeing it as a violation of 
natural law. Either way, the Supreme Court took on a legislative role in deciding the 
case. As Professor Kenji Yoshino writes, 
[w]hile Obergefell's most immediate effect was to legalize same-sex 
marriage across the land, its long-term impact could extend far beyond this 
context. To see this point, consider how much more narrowly the opinion 
could have been written. It could have invoked the equal protection and 
due process guarantees without specifying a formal level of review, and 
then observed that none of the state justifications survived even a 
deferential form of scrutiny. The Court had adopted this strategy in prior 
gay rights cases.127 
                                                          
120 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
703–05 (1974). 
121 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
122 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
123 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540. 
124 Brown, 349 U.S. at 294. 
125  Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1954). 
126 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
127 Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 147. (2015). 
 
Illustrating the differences of originalist and evolutionary document theories of interpreting the Constitution, 
Andrew W. Schwartz writes discussing the Obergefell case: 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme 
Court's recent decision finding that same-sex marriage is a constitutional 
right, offer a lucid comparison of originalism with evolutionary document 
theories of interpretation. The majority point out that the institution of 
marriage "has evolved over time." Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. 
at 6 (U.S. June 26, 2015). Finding that the right to marry the person of one's 
choice, regardless of their gender, was compelled by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority described its task as interpreting 
a constitutional provision that sets forth broad principles rather than specific 
requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do 
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Professor Laurence Tribe supports this position by stating,  
 
Professor Kenji Yoshino's splendid Comment makes clear just how 
misguided these glib detractions are, and eloquently elaborates the 
important doctrinal work done by Justice Kennedy's decision, which 
represents the culmination of a decades-long project that has 
revolutionized the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence. As Yoshino 
demonstrates, Obergefell has definitively replaced Washington v. 
Glucksberg's wooden three-prong test focused on tradition, specificity, and 
negativity with the more holistic inquiry of Justice Harlan's justly famous 
1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman, a mode of inquiry that was embodied in 
key opinions from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s.128 
 
Over time, society may come to a consensus of whether the Court decided the case 
correctly, but it currently serves as an example of a Court decision stepping out of 
the bounds of the role of the judiciary and acting in a way to solve aspects that the 
legislature could not fix in terms of Constitutional guarantees.129 
Although ideally the Court would follow logos, the catch is that the 
members of the Court are not purely guided by logos—as to be expected—because 
all humans, according to Plato, have three aspects of the soul within themselves. 
                                                          
not set its outer boundaries. That method respects our history and learns from 
it without allowing the past alone to rule the present. The nature of injustice 
is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote 
and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they 
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all person to 
enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord 
between the Constitution's central protections and a received legal stricture, a 
claim to liberty must be addressed. 
Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted). In sharp contrast, Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito, 
in their dissenting opinions, refused to recognize contemporary views of marriage, asserting that 
the notion of marriage as solely between a man and a woman is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition.’ Id. at 14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 2 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 701, 720-21 (1997)). Justice Scalia, in a separate dissent, 
relied on the public understanding of the meaning of marriage at the time the due process clause 
was ratified in 1868, which, he argued, universally confined marriage to a man and a woman. Id. at 
4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies Regulatory Takings 
Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 259 n.43. (2015). 
128 Laurence Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. 16, 16 (2015). 
129 Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1754–55 (2007) (“For me, the ‘living 
Constitution’ is not a convenient slogan for transforming our very imperfect Constitution into something better 
than it is. While the effort to make the Constitution into something truly wonderful is an ever-present temptation, 
the problem with this high-sounding aspiration is obvious: there are lots of competing visions of liberal 
democratic constitutionalism, and the Constitution shouldn't be hijacked by any one of them. The aim of 
interpretation is to understand the constitutional commitments that have actually been made by the American 
people in history, not the commitments that one or another philosopher thinks they should have made. On this 
key point, I am closer to Justice Scalia than to Professor Ronald Dworkin. I part company when Scalia joins 
Alfarabi in assuming that the formal text contains the complete constitutional canon, thereby cutting himself off 
from the last seventy-five years of constitutional achievement.”) 
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The idea of a three-part soul may be intended to understand the basic functions of 
an aspect of government, each member has an entire soul (ψυχή) governing their 
aspects of existence. This leads to more nuanced decisions, not only in the 
judiciary, but in all three branches of the government. 
In terms of the judiciary, stepping outside of the bounds of the separate 
powers or the role in the soul of the polity can have good and bad outcomes. Justice 
from the charioteer comes from consistency, as many philosophers have defined 
justice. In this case, the logos is seen through the Supreme Court and judiciary, 
applying and interpreting the law. 
B. Executive as Thumos 
In this paper the executive130 represents thumos. Thumos represents the 
spirit of the soul, as represented by the white horse in the Phaedrus.131 The white 
horse is spirited but controlled with a sense of potential shame.132 
1. Explaining Why the Executive is Not Logos 
However, in Professor Covitz’s formulation, the executive represents 
logos. As mentioned previously, Socrates states in the Republic that a person 
“watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle [logos] in his soul and 
the others the appetitive and the passionate [two representing eros],” and this person 
“is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,” 
meaning this person has not become evil, but just in between the pull of logos and 
the pull of eros, but is otherwise unable to make a decision.133 Socrates says this 
tension will resolve in “a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to 
the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty 
of soul and covetous of honor [meaning a turn to the thymotic part of the soul]”134 
This indicates that one will likely turn to politics while in the tension of 
logos and eros, and, in other words, has become thymotic. This is more akin to the 
President—rather than a member of the judiciary—who, in all likelihood, is in 
search of honors much like other politicians. This is not a negative aspect of the 
executive, necessarily, because if the executive of the country did not seek honor or 
maintain some “haughtiness,” other politicians and world leaders would take 
advantage of us. She must be a decisive president, not merely logical. Yet logic—as 
well as eros—may and must exist within her, but she must, as President, have a 
prevailing thymotic element. 
2. Cases and Examples Showing Why the Executive Represents Thumos 
Here, the thumos manifests itself where a part of the Executive branch of 
government—such as the EPA—would interpret a statute from the legislature and 
implement it. This occurs through the rules laid out by the Supreme Court and the 
judiciary as seen in the Chevron case. 
                                                          
130 It gains its source of power from U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
131
 PLATO, PHAEDRUS 248d–e. (Christopher J. Rowe trans., 1986). 
132 Id. at 247e–248e. 
133 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 550b. 
134 PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 550b. 
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 From 2013 through 2015, the Obama administration issued executive orders 
relating to immigration.135 By November of 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals declared the executive orders unconstitutional.136 Regardless of whether 
the executive orders are eventually upheld as constitutional or not, they represent 
the Executive branch of government conducting actions with the administration’s 
justification that they are the most “thymotic” solution to the immigration problem. 
If the orders are upheld to be constitutional after all, then the judiciary or the 
legislature will deem them to have been the most effective approach at the time to 
avoid a greater disaster later. If the orders are struck down as  unconstitutional, then 
the judiciary or the legislature will have deemed them to be an ineffective approach 
at the time. In an ironic sense, the immigration orders—if deemed constitutional—
will be seen as a way to unify the country in a spirited “thumotic” way to avoid a 
greater catastrophe.137 
Because the executive and the legislature are charged with carrying out the 
daily activities of the nation, international relations appears to be of paramount 
importance with spirited leadership. Thus, the leadership and executive actions may 
or may not be based in logos and eros but through a combination of the two as is 
the Platonic paradigm for thumos, which this paper argues fits into the paradigm of 
the executive branch of government in the US Constitution. 
C. The Legislature as Eros 
In this paper, the legislature138 represents eros. Eros represents the basic 
instincts and desires of the soul as represented by the black horse in the Phaedrus. 
The black horse can wear down the white horse and charioteer. 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act139 (Obamacare) was passed by 
Congress and signed into law in 2010.140 According to the Supreme Court, “the Act 
aims to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease 
the cost of health care. The Act's 10 titles stretch over 900 pages and contain 
hundreds of provisions.”141 
This example shows how the concept of justice is inconsistent. At the time 
it may be clear what the eros, the legislature, sees as justice. Over time, this may 
become unclear. 
                                                          
135 NATIONAL ARCHIVES, Barack Obama Executive Orders Disposition Tables, 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/obama.html. 
136 Matt Ford, A Ruling Against the Obama Administration on Immigration, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/fifth-circuit-obama-immigration/415077/; Michael D. 
Shear, Obama to Appeal Immigration Ruling to the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/politics/supreme-court-immigration-obama.html. 
137 “Catastrophe” used here in the Ancient Greek sense of “cata” and “strophe,” meaning under turned or 
overturning. Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“Etymology: < Greek καταστροϕή overturning, sudden 
turn, conclusion, <κατα-στρέϕειν to overturn, etc., <κατά down + στρέϕειν to turn.”). 
138 Its power generally emanates from U.S. CONST. art. 1 §1. 
139 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §18001 (2010). 
140 Sheryl Stolberg & Ronald Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html. 
141 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
To reiterate, this paper demonstrates that interpretation of the problems and 
the eventual purpose of the United States government, while simultaneously 
explaining its continued existence, requires analysis of the three-part structure of 
the United States federal government as outlined in the Constitution, and 
subsequently interpreted by all three parts of the government through the lens of the 
Platonic paradigm of logos, thumos, and eros as explained in Plato’s dialogues. The 
major premise of the paper is Plato’s three-part soul. The minor premise is the 
three-part structure of the United States government. The syllogism is the analysis 
which shows how each part of the Platonic soul represents itself in three parts: 
judiciary for logos, executive for thumos, and legislature for eros. 
Overall, this Platonic analysis of the Constitution’s structure and function 
could add to the dialogue of constitutional analysis. Indeed, there are arguments for 
originalist, textualist, and evolving constitutional doctrine, but there seems to be a 
basis for a Platonic interpretation of the Constitution. 
In line with a balanced soul of the polity and a balanced government, it 
would seem that each part of government would not reach into another’s duties.142 
As fate would have it, each person in the Platonic paradigm has the three parts of 
the Platonic soul. Although an individual may act in one part of the federal 
government, each person has all three parts. Thus, it is to be expected that different 
parts of the soul would manifest in a different part of the federal government. 
 
 
                                                          
142 James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
